[HTML][HTML] Covid-19: implications for insurer risk management and the insurability of pandemic risk

A Richter, TC Wilson - The Geneva risk and insurance review, 2020 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
This paper analyzes the insurability of pandemic risk and outlines how underwriting policies
and scenario analysis are used to build resilience upfront and plan contingency actions for …

Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand

R Peter, J Ying - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020 - Elsevier
We study optimal insurance demand for a risk-and ambiguity-averse consumer under
ambiguity about contract nonperformance. Ambiguity aversion lowers optimal insurance …

Optimal XL-insurance under Wasserstein-type ambiguity

C Birghila, GC Pflug - Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
We study the problem of optimal insurance contract design for risk management under a
budget constraint. The contract holder takes into consideration that the loss distribution is not …

Variance contracts

Y Chi, XY Zhou, SC Zhuang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.07103, 2020 - arxiv.org
We study the design of an optimal insurance contract in which the insured maximizes her
expected utility and the insurer limits the variance of his risk exposure while maintaining the …

Accounting Covenants in Credit Lines: Protecting Banks Against Aggregate Liquidity Shocks

M Chaderina, C Laux, A Tengulov - Available at SSRN 2617223, 2020 - papers.ssrn.com
We propose a novel role for accounting covenants in credit lines. Accounting covenants
protect banks against severe aggregate liquidity shocks and firms against losing liquidity at …

Equilibrium with monoline and multiline structures

R Ibragimov, D Jaffee, J Walden - Review of Finance, 2018 - academic.oup.com
We study a competitive market for risk-sharing, in which risk-tolerant providers of risk
protection, who face frictional costs in holding capital, offer coverage over a range of risk …

Variance insurance contracts

Y Chi, XY Zhou, SC Zhuang - Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2024 - Elsevier
We study the design of an optimal insurance contract in which the insured maximizes her
expected utility and the insurer limits the variance of his risk exposure while maintaining the …

Effects of Competition on Insurance Contract Formation

MR Powers, J Qiu, A Shen, Z Shen - North American Actuarial …, 2016 - Taylor & Francis
For an insurance transaction between a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-neutral
seller with positive transaction costs, it is well known that the buyer will prefer a policy …

[图书][B] Deductible insurance and the transfer of risk

C Gaffney - 2014 - search.proquest.com
This thesis develops a deepened understanding of insurance and its benefits, focusing on
practical aspects of insurance coverage and risk reduction. It is easy to see that the …

[引用][C] The Value of Accounting Noise: Credit Line Revocations and Aggregate Liquidity Shocks

M Chaderina, C Laux, A Tengulov - 2019