We analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans
and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi …

A multi–agent, moral–hazard model is used to analyze the connection between
compensation of bank employees below a CEO and bank risk. Unlike in the single–agent …

We evaluate the value of loan monitoring systems for a bank controlled by a micro-
prudential regulator. We investigate dynamic systems (an information channel that …

A multi-agent, moral-hazard model of a bank operating under deposit insurance and limited
liability is used to analyze the connection between compensation of bank employees (below …

We study two issues: the relationship between loan monitoring and loan risk and the
corporate value of banks' investments in loan monitoring systems. We find that dynamic …

Banks rely on risk managers to prevent their employees from making high risk low value
investments. Why can't the CEOs directly incentivize their employees to choose the most …

Outcomes in financial markets depend upon the information available to market participants,
and upon the contractual commitments that they can make. Many important commitments in …

This thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay I try to explain why risk managers exist
and provide a reason for risk management failure. Banks rely on risk managers to prevent …

This dissertation consists of three chapters covering the development and analysis of three
self-standing theoretical models. They all take an informational economics view and analyze …

A multi-agent, moral-hazard model of a bank operating under deposit insurance and limited
liability is used to analyze the connection between compensation of bank employees (below …