[图书][B] Choosing normative concepts

M Eklund - 2017 - books.google.com
Theorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness,
rightness, what ought to be done, and so on. In their investigations they employ and …

[图书][B] Replacing truth

K Scharp - 2013 - books.google.com
Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an
inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing …

[图书][B] Vagueness and degrees of truth

NJJ Smith - 2008 - books.google.com
In Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, Nicholas Smith develops a new theory of vagueness:
fuzzy plurivaluationism. A predicate is said to be vague if there is no sharply defined …

Putting a stake in stakeholder theory

EW Orts, A Strudler - Journal of business ethics, 2009 - Springer
The primary appeal of stakeholder theory in business ethics derives from its promise to help
solve two large and often morally difficult problems:(1) how to manage people fairly and …

[图书][B] Gradability in natural language: Logical and grammatical foundations

H Burnett - 2017 - books.google.com
This book presents a new theory of the relationship between vagueness, context-sensitivity,
gradability, and scale structure in natural language. Heather Burnett argues that it is …

Contradictions at the borders

D Ripley - International workshop on vagueness in …, 2009 - Springer
The Issue The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence,
which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form …

What are thick concepts?

M Eklund - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2011 - cambridge.org
Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between
thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among …

[图书][B] Vagueness and thought

A Bacon - 2018 - books.google.com
Vagueness is the study of concepts that admit borderline cases: the property of being bald is
vague because there are people who are neither definitely bald, nor definitely not bald. The …

Replacing truth

K Scharp - Inquiry, 2007 - Taylor & Francis
Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the
vast majority are “traditional” in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference …

Vagueness and zombies: Why 'phenomenally conscious' has no borderline cases

JA Simon - Philosophical Studies, 2017 - Springer
I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate 'phenomenally
conscious': for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature …