A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

We examine the long-term consequences of teacher discretion in grading of high-stakes
tests. Bunching in Swedish math test score distributions reveal that teachers inflate students …

We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information
to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker
communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages …

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We
provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study …

Quality certification not only informs consumers but also stimulates producers to supply
better-quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting …

We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal
about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the …

We document that college completion rates have increased since the 1990s, after declining
in the 1970s and 1980s. We find that most of the increase in graduation rates can be …

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric
senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective …