A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
F Dilmé - International Journal of Game Theory, 2024 - Springer
This paper provides a new characterization of belief consistency in extensive games. We
show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with …
show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with …
Satisficing Equilibrium
BSR Pradelski, B Tarbush - arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.00832, 2024 - arxiv.org
In a $\textit {satisficing equilibrium} $ each agent plays one of their $ k $ best pure actions,
but not necessarily their best action. We show that satisficing equilibria in which agents play …
but not necessarily their best action. We show that satisficing equilibria in which agents play …
Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive form Games
L Pahl, C Pimienta - arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.18449, 2024 - arxiv.org
We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and
Wilson (1997a, b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is …
Wilson (1997a, b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is …
Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games
F Dilme - Available at SSRN 4659679, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
Cho and Kreps (1987) proposed a series of criteria for selecting equilibria in signaling
games. Their procedure for applying each criterion was to identify all implausible sender …
games. Their procedure for applying each criterion was to identify all implausible sender …