Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive
schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes …

We study dynamic moral hazard when the principal can only commit to spot contracts. The
principal and agent are ex ante symmetrically uncertain about the difficulty of the job, and …

We study a dynamic principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about the importance
of effort. The quality of the agent's output is not observed directly. Instead, the principal jointly …

We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about
match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and …

A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project via a series of experiments and
then to execute it. The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low …

We study the steady state behavior of the market for a storable good where firms have
monopoly power instantaneously, but compete against future sellers. Consumers have …

We show that strategic delay can pose a problem in delegated R&D projects. In our model, a
principal delegates a research project to an agent. Depending on the agent's effort provision …

We study relational contracts in a firm-worker relationship with mutual uncertainty about
match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate output, and hence …

We study acquisition of imperfect signals, voting and trading by shareholders. Opportunities
to trade increase the value of information. As long as voting aggregates some information …