We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For …
M Aleksandrov, P Kilby - Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial …, 2022 - Springer
We look at the dial-a-ride problem through the lens of mechanism design, where the goal is to design mechanisms, toward natural objectives, in strategic settings, where customers act …
M Aleksandrov - EPIA Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022 - Springer
We consider classical vehicle routing problems with customer costs, vehicle feasibilities, driver profits, and driver responsiveness. We motivate a new template for these new …
T Chouaki, S Hörl - The 12th Symposium of the European Association …, 2024 - hal.science
On-demand mobility systems in which a fleet of shared vehicles are increasingly tested and deployed. Their efficiency gains are partly due to central algorithms that control the …
MD Aleksandrov - International Conference on Operations Research, 2022 - Springer
We consider routing problems where agents have preferences over pickup and delivery travel options. We look at the class of mechanisms that maximise social welfare. We study …