F Cai, S Han, D Li, Y Li - Journal of Financial economics, 2019 - Elsevier
We examine the extent to which institutional investors herd in the US corporate bond market and the price impact of their herding behavior. We find that the level of institutional herding …
This paper extends the work of Balachandran and Faff (2015) and reviews the literature on effective governance, financial markets, institutions, and crises. Specifically, we discuss the …
A Brav, W Jiang, T Li, J Pinnington - The Review of Financial …, 2024 - academic.oup.com
We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than …
Y Chu - The Review of Financial Studies, 2018 - academic.oup.com
This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm …
HT Nguyen, HV Phan, H Vo - International Review of Financial Analysis, 2023 - Elsevier
We show that the presence of dual holders following the mergers between institutional shareholders and creditors of industry firms leads to a decrease in the firms' excessive …
JH Mulherin, JM Netter, AB Poulsen - The handbook of the economics of …, 2017 - Elsevier
We review historical and current research on mergers and acquisitions. The literature is extensive. After a discussion of earlier survey articles (our “survey of the surveys”), we …
This paper shows evidence of a positive relationship between institutional dual holders, who hold both equity and debt in a firm, and voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emission …
Many papers in the mutual fund literature rely on a sample that matches the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund database with the fund holdings data from …
H Yang - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on corporate risk-taking. Specifically, I examine the role played by institutional dual-holders (ie, those simultaneously …