This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and
empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and …

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings
of incomplete information, and address this problem using" recommender mechanisms." A …

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially
private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not …

This paper is a survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy.
The connection is a natural one, but its study has been jump-started in recent years by the …

Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade
unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public …

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore
information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight …

We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal
would like to rely on messages by the monitor (the potential whistleblower) to target …

We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the
endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory …

We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent
selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation …

We examine the influence a self-interested social-media platform can have on election
outcomes. Using the framework of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we explore the effect of …