This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic
communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's …

A decision maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information.
Ideal actions of expert and decision maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what …

Agents need to be motivated to develop ideas and to share information regarding their
potential value. When the agents fail to agree on which alternative to implement, the …

This paper investigates a dynamic model of strategic communication between a principal
and an expert with conflicting preferences. In each period, the uninformed principal selects …

This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical
knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks …

Two divisions of a firm, overarched by a headquarters, are engaged in a decision problem.
Division one obtains information and informs division two who has the formal authority to …

We study endogeneous information acquisition before communication when there is
uncertainty about an expert's bias as well as about his information. Investment in information …

This thesis consists of five chapters on topics in mechanism design and voting. In Chapter 1,
we study a committee deciding collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain …

Two divisions of a firm, overarched by a headquarters, are engaged in a decision problem.
Division one obtains information and informs division two who has the formal authority to …

This paper explores the interaction between uncertain bias and endogeneous information
acquisition in strategic communication. I consider an expert who is privately informed about …