R Cooper, K Nikolov - International Economic Review, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
This article studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a “diabolic loop,” is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting …
P Bolton, M Oehmke - The Review of Financial Studies, 2019 - academic.oup.com
We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but faces …
E Dávila, A Walther - Journal of Financial Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
We explore how large and small banks make funding decisions when system-wide bailouts are possible. We show that bank size, purely on strategic grounds, is a key determinant of …
A Walther, L White - The Review of Financial Studies, 2020 - academic.oup.com
Recent reforms have given regulators broad powers to “bail-in” bank creditors during financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity …
L Pandolfi - Management Science, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks' funding costs, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two …
C Clayton, A Schaab - Available at SSRN 3455684, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines …
J Hilscher, Y Landskroner, A Raviv - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021 - Elsevier
We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive …
У монографії розглядаються теоретичні та практичні аспекти проблеми формування нового світового фінансового порядку. Автором розкрито суть та детермінанти …
This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in policies on banks' funding cost, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages …