Financial regulatory reform after the crisis: An assessment

D Duffie - Management Science, 2018 - pubsonline.informs.org
This is a survey of progress with the postcrisis global (G20) reform of the financial system, in
five key areas of new regulation:(1) making financial institutions more resilient;(2) ending …

Government debt and banking fragility: The spreading of strategic uncertainty

R Cooper, K Nikolov - International Economic Review, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
This article studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction,
termed a “diabolic loop,” is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting …

Bank resolution and the structure of global banks

P Bolton, M Oehmke - The Review of Financial Studies, 2019 - academic.oup.com
We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE)
resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but faces …

Does size matter? Bailouts with large and small banks

E Dávila, A Walther - Journal of Financial Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
We explore how large and small banks make funding decisions when system-wide bailouts
are possible. We show that bank size, purely on strategic grounds, is a key determinant of …

Rules versus discretion in bank resolution

A Walther, L White - The Review of Financial Studies, 2020 - academic.oup.com
Recent reforms have given regulators broad powers to “bail-in” bank creditors during
financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity …

Bail-in and bailout: Friends or foes?

L Pandolfi - Management Science, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks' funding costs,
incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two …

[PDF][PDF] Bail-Ins, Optimal Regulation, and Crisis Resolution

C Clayton, A Schaab - Available at SSRN 3455684, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the
presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines …

Optimal regulation, executive compensation and risk taking by financial institutions

J Hilscher, Y Landskroner, A Raviv - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021 - Elsevier
We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of
risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive …

[PDF][PDF] Новий світовий фінансовий порядок

ЛБ Колінець - 2018 - dspace.wunu.edu.ua
У монографії розглядаються теоретичні та практичні аспекти проблеми формування
нового світового фінансового порядку. Автором розкрито суть та детермінанти …

[PDF][PDF] Bail-in vs. bailout: a false dilemma

L Pandolfi - CSEF Working Papers, 2018 - csef.it
This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in policies on banks' funding cost, incentives for loan
monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages …