J Kastl - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012 - Elsevier
I analyze a model of a private value divisible good auction with different payment rules, standard rationing rule pro-rata on-the-margin and both with and without a restriction on the …
F Alvarez, FJ André - Environmental and Resource Economics, 2015 - Springer
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on …
We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent …
F Alvarez, FJ André - The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016 - degruyter.com
We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both in the auction and in the secondary market while its competitor behaves in a …
MA Espinosa, A Riascos - Documento CEDE, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show …
Establishing existence and characterizing equilibria are both important achievements in the study of auctions. However, we recognize that equilibria existence results form the basis for …
F Alvarez, C Mazón - Economic Theory, 2012 - Springer
We construct a model of multi-unit auctions in which I bidders bid for two indivisible units of a common value good. Using a first-order approach, we find that there are equilibria in which …
Several important auction settings, including treasury auctions in Canada and the US, have the feature that some bidders (dealers) observe the bids of a subset of other bidders …