[HTML][HTML] Credence goods in the literature: What the past fifteen years have taught us about fraud, incentives, and the role of institutions

L Balafoutas, R Kerschbamer - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental …, 2020 - Elsevier
We review the literature on credence goods since Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). We
consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of …

The economics of credence goods: An experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition

U Dulleck, R Kerschbamer, M Sutter - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and
consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under-and overtreatment or market …

Explaining variations in test ordering in primary care: protocol for a realist review

C Duddy, G Wong - BMJ open, 2018 - bmjopen.bmj.com
Introduction Studies have demonstrated the existence of significant variation in test-ordering
patterns in both primary and secondary care, for a wide variety of tests and across many …

Agency problems and reputation in expert services: Evidence from auto repair

HS Schneider - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Using a field experiment involving undercover visits to auto repair garages with a test
vehicle, I first examine how asymmetric information between mechanics and motorists over …

[PDF][PDF] 中国医疗服务市场中的信息不对称程度测算

卢洪友, 连玉君, 卢盛峰 - 经济研究, 2011 - file.lianxh.cn
内容提要: 本文构建了一个医疗服务市场上信息不对称程度的测度模型, 并基于“中国健康与营养
调查”(CHNS) 中微观个体调查数据, 对医疗服务市场上医患双方的信息程度及其对最终的医疗 …

How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods

R Kerschbamer, M Sutter, U Dulleck - The Economic Journal, 2017 - academic.oup.com
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers
about the surplus‐maximising quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark‐up …

Theory of the firm, management and stakeholders: An Islamic perspective

T Azid, M Asutay, U Burki - Islamic Economic Studies, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper explores the impact of the behaviour of a firm and its management on its
stakeholders operating within the framework of Islamic law and morality and draws a sketch …

Queuing for expert services

LG Debo, LB Toktay… - Management …, 2008 - pubsonline.informs.org
We consider a monopolist expert offering a service with a “credence” characteristic. A
credence service is one in which the customer cannot verify, even after a purchase, whether …

Credence goods, costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation

H Bester, M Dahm - The Economic Journal, 2018 - academic.oup.com
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert in a credence goods model
when:(i) the expert's choice of diagnosis effort is not observable;(ii) the expert might …

Credence goods markets with conscientious and selfish experts

T Liu - International Economic Review, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
In a credence good market, sellers know more about buyers' necessity of the good. Because
of this information asymmetry, a selfish seller may exaggerate buyers' necessity of the good …