Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists
to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists …

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions
described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and …

Our goal in this paper is to use an evolutionary approach to explain the existence and
design features of human moral cognition. Our premise is that humans are under selection …

Carbon prices are the most cost-effective instrument to reduce CO emissions, but there is
strong political opposition to raising them to the efficient level. Therefore, additional efforts of …

We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their
fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences …

We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Each
subject had to choose an action as first mover and a conditional action as second mover. All …

The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast
and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that …

Strategies of players in a population are updated according to the behavioural rules of
agents, where each agent is a player or a coalition of players. It is known that classic results …

We model game-theoretic situations in which agents motivated by Kantian ethics interact
with conventional Nashian agents. We define the concept of generalized Kant–Nash …