We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters'
choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the …

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some
probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to …

Cognitive economics is an emerging interdisciplinary field that uses the tools of cognitive
science to study economic and social decision-making. Although most strains of cognitive …

A sender seeks to persuade a group of heterogeneous voters to adopt an action. We
analyze the sender's information-design problem when the collective decision is made …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent
information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender …

This paper introduces private sender information in a game of Bayesian persuasion with
monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the …

A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the
state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize …

We study a sender's optimal choice of precision when he selects from a class of random
signals to persuade a receiver to accept his request, with higher costs associated with …

We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante
commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We …