L Schaedler, L Graf-Vlachy, A König - Long Range Planning, 2022 - Elsevier
Of all actors involved in managing an organizational crisis, strategic leaders play a particularly central role. However, the growing scholarship on the impact of strategic leaders …
A Ferrell, H Liang, L Renneboog - Journal of financial economics, 2016 - Elsevier
In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social …
We hypothesize that CSR serves as a control mechanism to reduce deviations from optimal risk taking, and therefore, CSR curbs excessive risk taking and reduces excessive risk …
U Malmendier, G Tate - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2015 - aeaweb.org
In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework that allows us to synthesize and assess the burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence. We also provide novel …
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …
T Chen, J Harford, C Lin - Journal of financial Economics, 2015 - Elsevier
Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial …
This article examines managers' incentive to play it safe. We find that, after managers are insulated by the adoption of an antitakeover law, they take value-destroying actions that …
U Malmendier, G Tate, J Yan - The Journal of finance, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued …