In a Stackelberg Security Game, a defender commits to a randomized deployment of security resources, and an attacker best-responds by attacking a target that maximizes his utility …
F Fang, AX Jiang, M Tambe - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2013 - jair.org
Abstract In recent years, Stackelberg Security Games have been successfully applied to solve resource allocation and scheduling problems in several security domains. However …
Stackelberg security games have been widely deployed to protect real-word assets. The main solution concept there is the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE), which optimizes …
J Gan, M Han, J Wu, H Xu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.14990, 2023 - arxiv.org
This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg …
M Tambe, AX Jiang, B An… - … spring symposium on …, 2014 - teamcore.seas.harvard.edu
The goal of this paper is to (re) introduce a real-world challenge problem for researchers in multiagent systems and beyond, where our collective efforts may have a significant impact …
In this paper, we describe the model, theory developed, and deployment of PROTECT, a game-theoretic system that the United States Coast Guard (USCG) uses to schedule patrols …
FM Delle Fave, AX Jiang, Z Yin, C Zhang… - Journal of Artificial …, 2014 - jair.org
Attacker-Defender Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have emerged as an important research area in multi-agent systems. However, existing SSGs models yield fixed, static …
B An, M Tambe, A Sinha - Improving Homeland Security …, 2017 - books.google.com
Security is a critical concern around the world that arises in protecting our ports, airports, transportation or other critical national infrastructure, curtailing the illegal flow of drugs …
The security community has witnessed a significant increase in the number of different types of security threats. This situation calls for the design of new techniques that can be …