We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information
provides verifiable but potentially vague information (ie, about the quality of a product) to a …

We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for
iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the …

Epistemic justifications of solution concepts often refer to type structures that are sufficiently
rich. One important notion of richness is that of a complete type structure, ie, a type structure …

We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive
rationalizability that embodies a new version of “common cautious belief in rationality” based …

Using lexicographic probability systems as representations of players' beliefs, we define the
solution procedure of directed lexicographic rationalizability. We show that the procedure …

Economic predictions often hinge on two intuitive premises: agents rule out the possibility of
others choosing unreasonable strategies ('strategic reasoning'), and prefer strategies that …

Aumann's seminal agreement theorem deals with the impossibility for agents to
acknowledge their distinct posterior beliefs. We consider agreeing to disagree in an …

After having observed a deviation from backward induction, a player might deem the
opponent prone to deviate from backward induction again, making it worthwhile to deviate …

In this dissertation I examine issues related to uncertainty and robustness in game theory. In
Chapter 1 a strategic setting is analyzed where players face Knightian uncertainty about the …