Implementation theory
E Maskin, T Sjöström - Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
Implementation theory
TR Palfrey - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2002 - Elsevier
Chapter 61 Implementation theory - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
A crash course in implementation theory
MO Jackson - Social choice and welfare, 2001 - Springer
A crash course in implementation theory Page 1 Soc Choice Welfare 2001) 18: 655±708 9999
2001 A crash course in implementation theory Matthew O. Jackson Humanities and Social …
2001 A crash course in implementation theory Matthew O. Jackson Humanities and Social …
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
B Dutta, A Sen - Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 - Elsevier
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest”
individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true …
individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true …
On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
W Thomson - Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 - Springer
This is a study of the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and
resource allocation. It begins with a user's guide. This guide first describes the components …
resource allocation. It begins with a user's guide. This guide first describes the components …
The theory of implementation of social choice rules
R Serrano - SIAM review, 2004 - SIAM
Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, ie, a mapping
from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters …
from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters …
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
I Segal - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the
(sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice …
(sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice …
Non-cooperative implementation of the core
The aim of this paper is to examine the non-cooperative basis of the core. We provide
mechanisms that are motivated closely by the very description of the core, and have the …
mechanisms that are motivated closely by the very description of the core, and have the …
Non-excludable public good experiments
We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first
stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing …
stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing …
Divide-and-permute
W Thomson - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We construct “simple” games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the
problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the …
problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the …