Random forests have been widely used for their ability to provide so-called importance
measures, which give insight at a global (per dataset) level on the relevance of input …

We study a non linear weighted Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) for cooperative games with
transferable utility, in which the weights are endogenously given by the players' stand-alone …

We present new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted
TU-value with the worths of the singletons as weights. The presented characterizations are …

We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games,
which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of …

A new concept for TU-values, called value dividends, is introduced. Similar to Harsanyi
dividends, value dividends are defined recursively and provide new characterizations of …

In this paper we introduce the notion of group contributions in TU-games and propose a new
class of values which we call the class of k-lateral Shapley values. Most of the values for TU …

In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the
Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize positive Proper Shapley …

We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first
assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average stand …

A class of solutions are introduced by lexicographically minimizing the complaint of
coalitions for cooperative games with transferable utility. Among them, the nucleolus is an …

This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic
characterizations of either solutions already studied in the literature or new solutions. The …