Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in
some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has …

1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

Abstract In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections-
--attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting candidates or …

We study elections in which voters may submit partial ballots consisting of truncated lists:
each voter ranks some of her top candidates (and possibly some of her bottom candidates) …

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences
as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated …

The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the votersʼ preferences over
the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a …

Instant runoff voting (IRV) is an increasingly-popular alternative to traditional plurality voting
in which voters submit rankings over the candidates rather than single votes. In practice …

Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting,
there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is …

We study the problem of computing possible and necessary winners for partially specified
weighted and unweighted tournaments. This problem arises naturally in elections with …

We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a
manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, ie, new candidates that are so …