Policy uncertainty (PU) influences the financial and investment decisions of the firm. We use
global data to extend the nascent empirical finance literature on policy uncertainty by …

This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis
of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future …

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers׳ roles in accounting
manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO׳ s power to …

This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure
at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's …

This paper examines the role of conservatism when an agent can manipulate upcoming
earnings before all uncertainty is resolved. An increase in conservatism, by reducing the …

The recent global financial crisis (GFC) has put under scrutiny the sound remuneration
policy and consequently the incentives design that influences risk-taking by managers in the …

We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral
hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures …

Abstract Prior research (eg, Dechow, Huson, and Sloan) documents that, on average,
compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In …

This study examined how the relationship between information asymmetry and earnings
management was affected by audit quality as an example of emerging markets using a …

Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debt
covenant violations. We study how a firm's ability to manipulate reports affects the terms of its …