Imagine you are sitting at Starbuck glancing at the blue coffee mug in front of you. The mug
is blue on the outside, white on the inside. It's large for a mug. And it's nearly full of freshly …

According to the inferential view of language comprehension, we hear a speaker's utterance
and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the …

Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and
seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides …

As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any
experience (eg perceptual, memorial, imaginative, etc.), if it has a distinctive kind of …

There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of
perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes …

Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p,
then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers …

Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience,
really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual …

METAPHYSICS AS ESSENTIALLY IMAGINATIVE AND AIMING AT UNDERSTANDING Page 1
American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 60, Number 1, January 2023 ©2023 by the Board of …

Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see (hear, taste, etc.) is
influenced by such “cognitive” states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief …

Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a
role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer …