Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on
package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes …

We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the
connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of …

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented,
and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to …

Detecting cartels Page 1 Harrington, Joseph E. Working Paper Detecting cartels Working Paper,
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …

This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or
ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the …

The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

We study entry and bidding in procurement auctions where contracts are awarded to the bid
closest to a trimmed average bid. These auctions, common in public procurement, create …

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult
because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that …

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents'
collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents …

On-line auction fraud is the most frequently reported Internet crime. This research
investigates whether on-line reputation systems are a useful mechanism for potential buyers …