[引用][C] A course in game theory

MJ Osborne - 1994 - books.google.com
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for
graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations …

Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium

E Kalai, E Lehrer - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
Each of n players, in an infinitely repeated game, starts with subjective beliefs about his
opponents' strategies. If the individual beliefs are compatible with the true strategies chosen …

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

P Jehiel - Journal of Economic theory, 2005 - Elsevier
In complex situations, agents use simplified representations to learn how their environment
may react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy …

Peer prediction without a common prior

J Witkowski, DC Parkes - Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
Reputation mechanisms at online opinion forums, such as Amazon Reviews, elicit ratings
from users about their experience with different products. Crowdsourcing applications, such …

Subjective equilibrium in repeated games

E Kalai, E Lehrer - Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
A NASH EQUILIBRIUM, of an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is a vector
of behavior strategies, f=(f1, f2,..., f), with each player's strategy, fi, being a best response to …

Subjective games and equilibria

E Kalai, E Lehrer - Games and economic behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of
strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and …

On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions

A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - Proceedings of the …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …

Self-confirming equilibrium and model uncertainty

P Battigalli, S Cerreia-Vioglio, F Maccheroni… - American Economic …, 2015 - aeaweb.org
We analyze a notion of self-confirming equilibrium with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes that
generalizes the traditional concept. We show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity …

Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment

C Aina, P Battigalli, A Gamba - Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 - Elsevier
In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the
credibility of promises or threats at odds with personal gain maximization. We address this …

Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games

P Battigalli, R Corrao, M Dufwenberg - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2019 - Elsevier
Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos et al.(1989) and significantly
generalized by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard game theoretic …