Kidney exchange: An operations perspective

I Ashlagi, AE Roth - Management Science, 2021 - pubsonline.informs.org
Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier

T Andersson, J Kratz - The Review of Economic Studies, 2020 - academic.oup.com
Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier
feasible. This article investigates how such technology should be implemented when …

Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: An economic policy perspective

T Sönmez, MU Ünver - Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2017 - academic.oup.com
Within the last decade, the use of living-donor kidney exchanges for transplants has
emerged as a cross-disciplinary success for medical doctors and ethicists, market design …

Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants

EJ Heo, S Hong, Y Chun - Journal of Health Economics, 2022 - Elsevier
A recent development of immunosuppressive protocols (or simply, suppressants) offers a
new option to patients suffering from end-stage renal disease: transplants from biologically …

Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

EJ Heo, S Hong, Y Chun - Economic Theory, 2021 - Springer
Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive
kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use …

[HTML][HTML] Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange

J Kratz - Journal of Economic Theory, 2024 - Elsevier
There is no conflict between maximizing the number of transplants and giving priority to, eg,
highly HLA-sensitized recipients in kidney exchange programs that only permit pairwise …

Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule

J Kim, M Li - Theoretical Economics, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing
incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor‐priority rule, which grants priority for …

Assignment maximization

MO Afacan, I Bó, B Turhan - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable
outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto …

Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications

T Sonmez, MU Ünver - Handbook of the Economics of Matching, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We survey the literature on applications of matching theory under non-transferable utility. We
cover the following six applications in detail: living-donor kidney exchange, living-donor liver …

[图书][B] Triage in kidney exchange

J Kratz - 2019 - york.ac.uk
This paper studies a kidney exchange problem in which a planner sorts patients into “priority
groups” based on, eg, the severity of their conditions. The planner may choose to allow …