Homo moralis—preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching

I Alger, JW Weibull - Econometrica, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is
driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private …

Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening

KA Brekke, K Nyborg - Resource and Energy Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
Corporate social responsibility can improve firms' ability to recruit highly motivated
employees. This can secure socially responsible firms' survival even in a highly competitive …

Evolution and Kantian morality

I Alger, JW Weibull - Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of
evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups …

Language, meaning, and games: A model of communication, coordination, and evolution

S Demichelis, JW Weibull - American Economic Review, 2008 - aeaweb.org
Abstract Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk
approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence …

Moonlighting: public service and private practice

G Biglaiser, C Albert Ma - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public‐service physicians may refer patients
to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave …

The Economics of Insurance Law-A Primer

R Avraham - Conn. Ins. LJ, 2012 - HeinOnline
This article presents a law and economics perspective on the topic of insurance law as a
whole. In doing so it provides both an overview major topics in insurance law as well as a …

Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

R Deneckere, S Severinov - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others.
Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So …

Reserve prices in auctions as reference points

S Rosenkranz, PW Schmitz - The Economic Journal, 2007 - academic.oup.com
We consider second‐price and first‐price auctions in the symmetric independent private
values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have …

Implementation with partial provability

E Ben-Porath, BL Lipman - Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Elsevier
We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more
than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with …

Economic analysis of insurance fraud

P Picard - Handbook of insurance, 2000 - Springer
We survey recent developments in the economic analysis of insurance fraud. The paper first
sets out the two main approaches to insurance fraud that have been developed in the …