Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market

AG Bonifacio, N Guiñazu, N Juarez, P Neme… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her
current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it? We …

On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings

P Neme, J Oviedo - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021 - Elsevier
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q-responsive preferences,
we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of …

[PDF][PDF] Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search

GE Bilgin - 2024 - raw.githubusercontent.com
I analyze a canonical many-to-one matching market within a decentralized search model
with frictions, where a finite number of firms and workers meet randomly until the market …

Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets

N Juarez, P Neme, J Oviedo - Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 - Elsevier
We study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings for a many-to-many
matching market. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two natural …

[PDF][PDF] Decentralized Many-to-One Matching with Bilateral Search

GE Bilgin - 2023 - congresscreator.org
In this paper, I analyze a finite decentralized many-to-one search model, where firms and
workers meet randomly. In line with the existing literature, stable matchings of the many-to …

[PDF][PDF] Lattice Structure For Random Matching Markets

N Juárez, PA Neme, J Oviedo - arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.08156, 2020 - academia.edu
arXiv:2002.08156v1 [econ.TH] 19 Feb 2020 Lattice Structure For Random Matching Markets
Page 1 arXiv:2002.08156v1 [econ.TH] 19 Feb 2020 Lattice Structure For Random Matching …

[PDF][PDF] Lattice Structure For Random Stable Matching Markets

N Juárez, PA Neme, J Oviedo - arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.08156, 2020 - academia.edu
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random
stable matchings. We define the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for both …