Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a
profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching …

This article discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of
designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide …

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets. A school may suppress
some information about students in order to improve their average job placement. We …

In September of 1998 the Judicial Conference abandoned its most recent attempt to regulate
the timing of interviews and offers in the process for hiring federal judicial law clerks. In …

The entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized
clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a …

We use a two-period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of
participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling. Unraveling provides …

Many entry-level labor markets (and quite a few other markets) have at some point in their
history suffered from the “unraveling” of hiring decisions. Unraveling is typically a dynamic …

This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand
uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales in prior …

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the
beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two …