This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate when the details
of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a repeated game in which one …

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where,
each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an …

We study repeated Bayesian games with communication and observable actions in which
the players' privately known payoffs evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain whose …

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were
conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study …

We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the
principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker …

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players'
payoffs depend only on their own type (known‐own payoff case). We describe an algorithm …

We study a dynamic principal–agent relationship with adverse selection and limited
commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the …

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are
uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution …

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009)[15] to N-player games with arbitrary
information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under …

The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage game is
repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff …