We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively
decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to …

In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social
choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are …

We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which
elect a committee of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide …

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for
formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two …

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of
voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond …

Participatory Budgeting (PB) has evolved into a key democratic instrument for resource
allocation in cities. Enabled by digital platforms, cities now have the opportunity to let …

A divisible public resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a
distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference rankings over projects …

We study the robustness of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB) rules to random
noise in the votes. First, we analyze the computational complexity of the# Flip-Bribery …

We introduce a family of normative principles to assess fairness in the context of
participatory budgeting. These principles are based on the fundamental idea that budget …

We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting
(PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering …