KA Bryan, J Lemus - Journal of Economic Theory, 2017 - Elsevier
How do innovation policies affect the direction of research? Is market-based innovation too radical or too incremental? We construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of …
A Hefti - Theoretical Economics, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria …
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the …
This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player …
A Chatterjee - Journal of International Economics, 2017 - Elsevier
Similar countries often choose very different policies and specialize in very distinct industries. This paper proposes a novel mechanism to explain policy diversity between …
Z Cao, X Yang - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018 - Elsevier
We distinguish among three types of symmetric games, which we name ordinary symmetric games, renaming symmetric games, and name-irrelevant symmetric games, in an order of …
L Li, Q Luo - Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2024 - Elsevier
In this study, we consider monotone comparative statics under interval uncertainty. We introduce interval-valued supermodular functions and interval-valued quasisupermodular …
T Iimura, T Watanabe - Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2014 - Elsevier
In this paper we show that a finite symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium if the payoff functions of players are integrally concave due to Favati and Tardella (1990). Since …
A Plan - University of Arizona Economics Work, 2017 - asafplan.com
This paper considers symmetry in games with more than two players. It is often noted that a two-player game is symmetric if it looks the same to both players. However, when there are …