Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey

E Elkind, M Lackner, D Peters - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09092, 2022 - arxiv.org
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

Reaching individually stable coalition structures in hedonic games

F Brandt, M Bullinger, A Wilczynski - … of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
The formal study of coalition formation in multiagent systems is typically realized using so-
called hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch …

Reaching individually stable coalition structures

F Brandt, M Bullinger, A Wilczynski - ACM Transactions on Economics …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the
framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this …

The complexity of debt swapping

H Froese, M Hoefer, L Wilhelmi - arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.11250, 2023 - arxiv.org
A debt swap is an elementary edge swap in a directed, weighted graph, where two edges
with the same weight swap their targets. Debt swaps are a natural and appealing operation …

[HTML][HTML] Stability Based on Single-Agent Deviations in Additively Separable Hedonic Games

F Brandt, M Bullinger, L Tappe - Artificial Intelligence, 2024 - Elsevier
Coalition formation is a central concern in multiagent systems. A common desideratum for
coalition structures is stability, defined by the absence of beneficial deviations of single …

Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

SM Yuen, A Igarashi, N Kamiyama… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an
initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of …

On reachable assignments in cycles

L Müller, M Bentert - … Decision Theory: 7th International Conference, ADT …, 2021 - Springer
The efficient and fair distribution of indivisible resources among agents is a common
problem in the field of Multi-Agent-Systems. We consider a graph-based version of this …

On reachable assignments in cycles and cliques

L Müller, M Bentert - arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.02218, 2020 - arxiv.org
The efficient and fair distribution of indivisible resources among agents is a common
problem in the field of\emph {Multi-Agent-Systems}. We consider a graph-based version of …

Reforming an Envy-Free Matching

T Ito, Y Iwamasa, N Kakimura, N Kamiyama… - Proceedings of the …, 2022 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider the problem of reforming an envy-free matching when each agent is assigned a
single item. Given an envy-free matching, we consider an operation to exchange the item of …

Swap dynamics in single-peaked housing markets

A Beynier, N Maudet, S Rey, P Shams - Autonomous Agents and Multi …, 2021 - Springer
This paper focuses on the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating resources to agents. We
consider a specific setting, usually referred to as a housing market, where each agent must …