Land finance in China: Analysis and review

J Gyourko, Y Shen, J Wu, R Zhang - China Economic Review, 2022 - Elsevier
China's land finance system has been a key contributor to the country's “economic miracle”
over recent decades. While there is much existing research on different components of the …

中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向: 为增长而竞争的代价

傅勇, 张晏 - 管理世界, 2007 - cqvip.com
经济分权同垂直的政治管理体制紧密结合是中国式分权的核心内涵, 本文在此背景下讨论地方
政府支出结构偏向的激励根源, 并通过构造财政分权指标和政府竞争指标, 利用1994~ 2004 …

The theory of international tax competition and coordination

M Keen, KA Konrad - Handbook of public economics, 2013 - Elsevier
This chapter surveys the theory of international tax competition and coordination, which,
matching the increasing policy importance of the topic, has grown substantially over the last …

中国的大国发展道路——论分权式改革的得失

王永钦, 张晏, 章元, 陈钊, 陆铭 - 经济研究, 2007 - cqvip.com
本文从分权式改革的视角提供了一个自洽的逻辑框架, 全面地分析了中国的发展道路.
这个逻辑框架不仅能够分析中国前期改革的成功, 也能够解释目前浮现的诸多社会经济问题 …

[PDF][PDF] 财政分权, 政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给

傅勇 - 经济研究, 2010 - oss.aisixiang.com
内容提要: 本文研究了分权背景下的财政体制和政府治理对非经济性公共物品供给的影响.
实证研究发现, 财政分权显著且可观地降低了基础教育的质量, 也减少了城市公用设施的供给 …

财政激励, 晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为

张莉, 王贤彬, 徐现祥 - 中国工业经济, 2011 - cqvip.com
近年来, 地方政府官员热衷于出让土地, 现有文献主要强调土地财政. 地方政府官员不仅面临财政
激励而且还面临政治激励: 在地方政府官员晋升以GDP 为主要考核指标的激励下 …

地方债务, 土地市场与地区工业增长

范剑勇, 莫家伟 - 经济研究, 2014 - cqvip.com
自2008 年全球金融危机以来, 中国地方政府性债务快速膨胀. 本文构建工业投资者一地方政府
模型, 从债务的双重引资作用角度分析地方政府举债冲动难以遏制的原因. 理论模型与实证分析 …

The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development

C Xu - Journal of economic literature, 2011 - aeaweb.org
China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction.
However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer …

[图书][B] How China became capitalist

R Coase, N Wang - 2016 - books.google.com
How China Became Capitalist details the extraordinary, and often unanticipated, journey
that China has taken over the past thirty five years in transforming itself from a closed …

Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world

CS Fan, C Lin, D Treisman - Journal of public economics, 2009 - Elsevier
How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by
corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived …