[图书][B] Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management

T Sterner, J Coria - 2013 - taylorfrancis.com
Thomas Sterner's book is an attempt to encourage more widespread and careful use of
economic policy instruments. The book compares the accumulated experiences of the use of …

Global public goods: a survey

W Buchholz, T Sandler - Journal of Economic Literature, 2021 - aeaweb.org
This survey investigates the increasing importance of global public goods (GPGs) in today's
interdependent world, driven by ever-growing, cross-border externalities and public good …

International environmental agreements: doomed to fail or destined to succeed? A review of the literature

W Marrouch, AR Chaudhuri - International Review of …, 2016 - nowpublishers.com
We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We
classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages …

[HTML][HTML] Beyond the Paris Agreement: Climate change policy negotiations and future directions

SN Seo - Regional Science Policy & Practice, 2017 - Elsevier
At the conclusion of the Paris conference, this paper provides a review of the history of
international negotiations on global warming for the past three decades with an emphasis …

Participation and duration of environmental agreements

M Battaglini, B Harstad - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …

Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: insights, critical remarks, and future challenges

M Finus - International Review of environmental and resource …, 2008 - dspace.stir.ac.uk
In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …

Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games

J Heitzig, K Lessmann, Y Zou - Proceedings of the National …, 2011 - National Acad Sciences
As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that
global mean temperature should not be allowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius …

The economics of climate change mitigation: How to build the necessary global action in a cost-effective manner

JM Burniaux, J Chateau, R Dellink, R Duval, S Jamet - 2009 - oecd-ilibrary.org
This paper examines the cost of a range of national, regional and global mitigation policies
and the corresponding incentives for countries to participate in ambitious international …

Can international environmental cooperation be bought?

C Fuentes-Albero, SJ Rubio - European Journal of Operational Research, 2010 - Elsevier
In this paper a two-stage game of international environmental agreement formation with
asymmetric countries is analytically solved. The equilibrium of the game makes it possible to …

Environmental agreements as clubs: Evidence from a new dataset of trade provisions

JF Morin, C Brandi, J Schwab - The Review of International Organizations, 2024 - Springer
Creating intergovernmental environmental clubs is a prominent policy proposal for
addressing global environmental problems. According to their proponents, environmental …