Starting from the observation that the European Union now possesses many of the attributes
of modern political systems, Hix and Høyland take an innovative approach to analysing …

The paper presents a dynamic game where players contribute to a public bad, invest in
technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n+ 1 stocks in the model, the …

We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving
default policy and a persistent agenda setter. Policy making proceeds until the agenda setter …

We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a
representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule …

Credence attributes of products are unobservable through search or experience. Some
consumers are willing to pay a premium for their provision, and in addition, citizens can …

We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an
infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment that can either be invested in …

We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which
preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in …

The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as
voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from …

Below, I illustrate how a wide range of political economics forces influence nations'
provisions of global public goods. The forces can make it difficult for international …

We introduce democratic mechanisms as a set of rules that must obey liberal democracy's
fundamental principles of equal voting and agenda rights. We show that an appropriate …