Operating system verification—an overview

G Klein - Sadhana, 2009 - Springer
This paper gives a high-level introduction to the topic of formal, interactive, machine-
checked software verification in general, and the verification of operating systems code in …

seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel

G Klein, K Elphinstone, G Heiser, J Andronick… - Proceedings of the …, 2009 - dl.acm.org
Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of
programming errors. We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked …

Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernel

G Klein, J Andronick, K Elphinstone, T Murray… - ACM Transactions on …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
We present an in-depth coverage of the comprehensive machine-checked formal verification
of seL4, a general-purpose operating system microkernel. We discuss the kernel design we …

[PDF][PDF] Security enhanced (se) android: bringing flexible mac to android.

S Smalley, R Craig - Ndss, 2013 - cs.columbia.edu
The Android software stack for mobile devices defines and enforces its own security model
for apps through its application-layer permissions model. However, at its foundation, Android …

Flexible and fine-grained mandatory access control on android for diverse security and privacy policies

S Bugiel, S Heuser, AR Sadeghi - 22nd USENIX Security Symposium …, 2013 - usenix.org
In this paper we tackle the challenge of providing a generic security architecture for the
Android OS that can serve as a flexible and effective ecosystem to instantiate different …

Linux security modules: General security support for the linux kernel

C Wright, C Cowan, S Smalley, J Morris… - 11th USENIX Security …, 2002 - usenix.org
The access control mechanisms of existing mainstream operating systems are inadequate to
provide strong system security. Enhanced access control mechanisms have failed to win …

Integrating flexible support for security policies into the Linux operating system

P Loscocco, S Smalley - … Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 01 …, 2001 - usenix.org
The protection mechanisms of current mainstream operating systems are inadequate to
support confidentiality and integrity requirements for end systems. Mandatory access control …

Improving Host Security with System Call Policies.

N Provos - USENIX Security Symposium, 2003 - usenix.org
We introduce a system that eliminates the need to run programs in privileged process
contexts. Using our system, programs run unprivileged but may execute certain operations …

EROS: a fast capability system

JS Shapiro, JM Smith, DJ Farber - Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM …, 1999 - dl.acm.org
EROS is a capability-based operating system for commodity processors which uses a single
level storage model. The single level store's persistence is transparent to applications. The …

[PDF][PDF] Implementing SELinux as a Linux security module

S Smalley, C Vance, W Salamon - NAI Labs Report, 2001 - cs.unibo.it
In March 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) gave a presentation about Security-
Enhanced Linux (SELinux) at the 2.5 Linux Kernel Summit. SELinux is an implementation of …