This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the …
P Vida, F Forges - Theoretical Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended …
F Koessler, F Forges - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2008 - JSTOR
Nous présentons une synthèse des principaux modèles de transmission stratégique de l'information. Dans une première partie, nous étudions les jeux dits de" cheap-talk", c'est-à …
In this paper, I consider three-player complete information games augmented with pre-play communication. Players can privately communicate with others, but not through a mediator. I …
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk …
We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that …