A modern, decision-theoretic framework can help clarify important practical questions of
experimental design. Building on our recent work, this chapter begins by summarizing our …

This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard,
and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based …

Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we
study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes …

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition
process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the …

I survey and discuss the recent literature on testing experts or probabilistic forecasts, which I
would describe as a literature on “strategic hypothesis testing” The starting point of this …

How should an expert send forecasts to maximize her utility subject to passing a calibration
test? We consider a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a …

We study decision making in complex discrete-time dynamic environments where Bayesian
optimization is intractable. A decision maker is equipped with a finite set of benchmark …

This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts
about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do …

We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a prediction model. In the
absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested and rejected, regardless of whether …

Hume (1748) challenged the idea that a general claim (eg,“all swans are white”) can be
validated by empirical evidence, no matter how compelling. We examine this issue from the …