SN Ali - Journal of Economic Theory, 2015 - Elsevier
I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder …
M Dahm, A Glazer - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015 - Elsevier
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future …
ПЮ Чеботарев, ВА Малышев, ЯЮ Цодикова… - Автоматика и …, 2018 - mathnet.ru
В предположениях модели социальной динамики, определяемой голосованием в стохастической среде (модель ViSE), исследуется эффективность эгоистической и …
PY Chebotarev, YY Tsodikov, AK Loginov… - Automation and Remote …, 2018 - Springer
In this paper, we study the efficiency of egoistic and altruistic strategies within the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) using …
By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs? How and why do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? This dissertation …
We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda …
M Gibilisco - Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2015 - michaelgibilisco.com
This paper studies the conditions under which minority proposal rights emerge from majority voting in a legislature. I develop a legislative bargaining model in which rules persist, ie …
Based on the models of legislative bargaining by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) and more important Diermeier and Fong (2011), this paper presents a model extension that allows for …
This thesis examines political institutions, their effects on group conflict and compromise, and the conditions under which majorities relinquish their monopoly on power and establish …