F Dilme - Open Research Europe, 2023 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
There are important public debates on how—or even whether—to regulate information about previous transactions in different markets. Examples are the regulation of cookies in …
A sender engages in costly signaling to influence a decision maker, who observes a biased noisy signal and decides when to irreversibly take an action to match the binary state. We …
F Dilmé - Available at SSRN 4750700, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper studies bargaining between a seller and a buyer with binary private valuation. Because the setting is more tractable than the case of general valuation distributions …
H Liu - Available at SSRN 4750701, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper studies repeated nonlinear pricing problems between a long-lived buyer who privately observes her marginal willingness to pay, which can take arbitrarily finitely many …
We consider the sale of a single indivisible common-value good in a dynamic market where short-lived buyers arrive over time. Buyers observe private signals about the value. The …
M Panov - Available at SSRN 3614943, 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
I propose a way to formulate and solve for sub-game perfect equilibria of continuous-time repeated games with both observable and unobservable actions. The main idea is to study …