We prove that the Maskin monotonicity⁎ condition (proposed by Bergemann et al.(2011))
fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and …

This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in
incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity …

A (deterministic) social choice correspondence F, mapping states into outcomes, is
rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support …

A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost
sufficient for rationalizable implementation of correspondences. Uniform monotonicity is …

This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms,
where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a …

A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies (RoRat-
implementable) if every (interim correlated) rationalizable outcome on every type space …

Recently, a trend has developed around the world for referenda to be used to determine
binary social decisions. In a couple of setups, we prove impossibility results of the following …

arXiv:2211.05431v1 [econ.TH] 10 Nov 2022 Nash implementation by stochastic
mechanisms: a simple full characterization* Page 1 arXiv:2211.05431v1 [econ.TH] 10 Nov …

A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need
to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only …

We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We
show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if …