This paper is an attempt to broaden economic discourse by importing insights into human
behavior not just from psychology, but also from sociology and anthropology. Whereas in …

Some people commonly know a proposition just in case they all know it, they all know that
they all know it, they all know that they all know that they all know it, and so on. They …

Logic and game theory have had a few decades of contacts by now, with the classical
results of epistemic game theory as major high-lights. In this paper, we emphasize a recent …

History based models, introduced by Parikh and Ramanujam, provide a natural
mathematical model of social interactive situations. These models offer a “low level” …

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability
pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases …

We consider Aumann's famous result on “agreeing to disagree” in the context of imprecise
probabilities. Our primary aim is to reveal a connection between the possibility of agreeing to …

Robert Aumann presents his Agreement Theorem as the key conditional:“if two people have
the same priors and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these …

A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts
at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an …

Modeling rational agents' reasoning in interactive contexts and identifying its logic is the
general analytic project to which this dissertation contributes. The borders of this project run …

In this paper we study Aumann's Agreement Theorem in dynamic-epistemic logic. We show
that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreements in" epistemic-plausibility …