The RAND health insurance experiment, three decades later

A Aron-Dine, L Einav, A Finkelstein - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013 - aeaweb.org
Between 1974 and 1981, the RAND health insurance experiment provided health insurance
to more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across …

The response of drug expenditure to nonlinear contract design: Evidence from Medicare Part D

L Einav, A Finkelstein, P Schrimpf - The quarterly journal of …, 2015 - academic.oup.com
We study the demand response to nonlinear price schedules using data on insurance
contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in …

Moral hazard in health insurance: do dynamic incentives matter?

A Aron-Dine, L Einav, A Finkelstein… - Review of Economics …, 2015 - direct.mit.edu
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate
whether health care utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear …

The effect of patient cost sharing on utilization, health, and risk protection

H Shigeoka - American Economic Review, 2014 - aeaweb.org
This paper exploits a sharp reduction in patient cost sharing at age 70 in Japan, using a
regression discontinuity design to examine its effect on utilization, health, and financial risk …

Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis

P Bajari, C Dalton, H Hong… - The RAND Journal of …, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may
generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However …

Moral hazard in health insurance: How important is forward looking behavior?

A Aron-Dine, L Einav, A Finkelstein, MR Cullen - 2012 - nber.org
We investigate whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the
non-linear pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the …

Intertemporal substitution in health care demand: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment

H Lin, DW Sacks - Journal of Public Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
Nonlinear cost-sharing in health insurance encourages intertemporal substitution because
patients can reduce their out-of-pocket costs by concentrating spending in years when they …

Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance

AE Kowalski - International journal of industrial organization, 2015 - Elsevier
Insurance induces a tradeoff between the welfare gains from risk protection and the welfare
losses from moral hazard. Empirical work traditionally estimates each side of the tradeoff …

[图书][B] Pricing analytics: Models and advanced quantitative techniques for product pricing

WR Paczkowski - 2018 - taylorfrancis.com
The theme of this book is simple. The price–the number someone puts on a product to help
consumers decide to buy that product–comes from data. Specifically, itcomes from …

Cost-sharing design matters: A comparison of the rebate and deductible in healthcare

M Remmerswaal, J Boone, M Bijlsma… - Journal of Public …, 2019 - Elsevier
Since 2006, the Dutch population has faced two different cost-sharing schemes in health
insurance for curative care: a mandatory rebate in 2006 and 2007, and a mandatory …