We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information
to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is …

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We
provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study …

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric
senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective …

We study a sender's optimal choice of precision when he selects from a class of random
signals to persuade a receiver to accept his request, with higher costs associated with …

We incorporate product demonstrations into a game theoretic model of price competition.
Demonstrations may include product samples, trials, return policies, online review platforms …

This article challenges the prevailing view that pure informational lobbying (in the absence
of political contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) leads to better informed …

We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the
behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a …

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various
information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer …

We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora's Box problem
[31], where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what …

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the
patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective …