Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post …

We consider efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Green and
Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof …

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism–a
symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The …

A general approach to the design of budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms is to use the
Shapley value, applied to the given cost function, to define payments from the players to the …

Strategy-proof and budget-balanced ranking mechanisms assign q units of an object to n
agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all …

Excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have
similar coordination problems. In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate …

Strategy-proof, budget balanced, and envy-free linear mechanisms assign p identical
objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus …

We consider a mechanism design problem for the provision of a binary excludable public
good. We characterize the augmented serial rules (Ohseto, Econ Theory 26: 589–606 2005) …

We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as
lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule …

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism-a
symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our …