The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and
highlight the influence of bargaining 'postures' on bargaining outcomes. A complete …

As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with
strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a …

When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs
coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage‐game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible …

In recent years there has been extensive research on game-theoretic models for
infrastructure security. In time-critical domains where the security agency needs to execute …

WE CONSIDER A GAME between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient
opponent, player 2. As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player's type …

Attacker-Defender Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have emerged as an important
research area in multi-agent systems. However, existing SSGs models yield fixed, static …

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions
and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while …

I highlight how reputational concerns provide a natural explanation for “deadline effects,” the
high frequency of deals prior to a deadline in bargaining. Rational agents imitate the …

Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Page 1 Games and
Economic Behavior 29, 274–308 (1999) Article ID game.1999.0722, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com …

We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally
patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form stage game of perfect …