M Boczoń, E Vespa, T Weidman… - Journal of the European …, 2024 - academic.oup.com
In repeated games, where both collusive and noncollusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, it is crucial to understand the likelihood of selection for each type of equilibrium …
It is usually difficult for patients to compare out-of-pocket prices for medical services. What are the implications for prices and welfare? In order to understand the effects of price …
E Vespa - International Economic Review, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can …
C Liu, E Zhu, Q Zhang, X Wei - International Journal of …, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
Game theory has become a standard tool for depicting and demonstrating various game‐ like phenomena by providing appropriate mathematical models and for analyzing and …
Most empirical work in economics has considered only a narrow set of measures as meaningful and useful to characterize individual behavior, a restriction justified by the …
In this paper, we use a unique two-stage experiment that randomized access to school vouchers across both markets and students in rural India to estimate the revealed …
E Vespa, AJ Wilson - Quantitative Economics, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is …
L Karp, H Sakamoto - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
We analyze a dynamic model of international environmental agreements where countries cannot make long-term commitments or use sanctions or rewards to induce cooperation …
We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other …