Abstract The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle …
B Harstad - Journal of Public Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from …
S Chae, P Heidhues - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004 - Elsevier
We propose a solution for bargaining models where groups of individuals bargain with each other. The solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups. An individual …
Below, I illustrate how a wide range of political economics forces influence nations' provisions of global public goods. The forces can make it difficult for international …
Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining …
We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse …
This book provides a detailed examination of the complex negotiation processes surrounding intergovernmental conferences in the European Union. Since the Treaty of …
AL Comstock - The Journal of Legislative Studies, 2024 - Taylor & Francis
This paper investigates the relationship between domestic legislative veto players and human rights treaty commitment. While research connects legislative veto players with …
B Boockmann - European Journal of Political Research, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
This article looks at the political and economic determinants of the ratification of International Labour Organisation conventions by 17 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and …