Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated
several times. This is possible because when parties comply, the punishment is not applied …

The purpose of this paper is to study the incentives of entrepreneurial actors to collaborate
with others in order to achieve superior performance. We consider an environment …

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical. In this chapter, we review the
rentseeking literature that explores the effects of forms of asymmetry between contestants …

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are
characterized by an exponent r> 1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1 …

In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants
compete à-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent à-la-Coase. We …

Conventional theories of competition classify contests as being either “productive”, when the
competitive efforts generate a surplus for society, or “unproductive”, when competition …

Abstract Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept that has become widely
accepted as an ethical claim for firms. It reflects a more recent distribution conflict over the …

The European Association of Law and Economics (EALE) asked me to write a Laudatio. It is
a great pleasure and honor to introduce Professor Francesco Parisi for the 2019 EALE …

Abstract The European Association of Law and Economics grants a biennial Lifetime
Achievement Award and Honorary Membership to a scholar “for his or her significant …